The current turmoil in Turkey may well be the vital test of its democracy that the EU has long been calling for, states Katinka Barysch – chief economist at the Centre for European Reform (CER). In a new article, she claims that if Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan succeeds in facing down the generals now, then future coups will become almost impossible. She concludes:

"The current crisis has added an extra degree of realism and caution to the often overly emotional debate about Turkey's accession. This is good. Now Turkey needs to concentrate on resolving disagreements about the presidency while respecting democratic rules. The early parliamentary election could be a plus, if the new government got on with reforms soon afterwards. In this case, the EU should not be shy to praise Turkey in its annual progress report in the autumn. And it should redouble its efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue so that it can lift the part-suspension of the talks."

As Bloomber reports, Turkey's economic growth unexpectedly accelerated to 5.2 percent in the fourth quarter as exports helped sustain a fifth year of uninterrupted expansion in the European Union membership candidate.

Moreover, "the rate rose from a revised 4.8 percent in the third quarter, the state statistics office in Ankara said on its Web site today. The economy had been expected to expand by 4.2 percent, according to the median estimate of 13 economists surveyed by Bloomberg."

What can Erdogan and Justice and Development party gain from this? Vincent Boland from Financial Times thinks that the economic growth will provide with political ammunition ahead of an autumn general election.

The process towards double elections might have political stability risks:

"Mr Erdogan is tipped to run in next month's presidential ballot, which will be decided by a vote in parliament. If he wins he will have to stand down as leader of the neo-Islamist Justice and Development party. This could hamper the party's chances in the general election in the autumn. There is even speculation that it could lead to a return of the system of coalition governments that have been the source of much of Turkey's past political instability."

Erdogan's possible cadidacy has some critics in Turkey. A recent Economist article titled Erdogan's dilamma says:

"That is because Turkey’s mildly Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose ruling AK Party has a big majority in parliament, is thinking of taking the top job himself. With the power to appoint the head of the army (NATO’s second-biggest), all of Turkey’s judges and its university rectors, a President Erdogan could advance his covert Islamist agenda unimpeded, his critics say. With his headscarf-wearing wife, Emine, as first lady, the fall of the secular republic would be complete."

However, also some supportes of Erdogan does not favour his candidacy:

"Even his supporters see plenty of reasons why he should not. Mr Erdogan has unrivalled charisma and could lead the AK Party to another big victory in November. Many businessmen fret that without him the party, a loose coalition of nationalists, Islamists and liberals, could fall apart, plunging Turkey back into instability. As president, Mr Erdogan’s autocratic instinct might spoil relations with Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister, who is his most likely successor and is no poodle."

Ariel Cohen at Eurasianet reports that Washington policymakers are scrambling to develop tactics that can counter Russia’s aggressive action aimed at cementing Kremlin control over Caspian Basin energy and export routes. Here a interesting remark on US concerns:

"Four major Eurasian energy developments during March have set off alarm bells inside the Beltway. First, Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany, the leader of that country’s former Communist Party, revealed March 12 that his country would throw its support behind a plan to pump Russian gas via Turkey to Europe, instead of joining fellow European Union states in backing the much-delayed Nabucco gas pipeline project. [...] The second development concerns an agreement by Russia, Bulgaria and Greece to construct an oil pipeline, dubbed Burgas-Alexandroupolis, which would bypass the Turkish-controlled Bosporus Straits, an oil transport chokepoint. [...] Finally, British Petroleum has hinted that its Russian partner TNK may sell its share in the TNK-BP joint venture, formed in 2003, to a Russian state-owned company. At the same time Russia is developing plans on building the second Bosporus bypass from a port on the Black Sea, such as Samsun to the Mediterranean."

Cohen predicts that US' action has no much support:

"However, Brussels is split over what to do about Russia’s ominous behavior. Germany is already deferential to Russia’s energy interests, and Berlin appears to want to do nothing that would disturb the status quo, despite the fact that the EU’s long-term energy interests demand that it diversify its sources of energy."